
On 3 July 2026, the Ministry of Economic Affairs published the revised government-wide cloud policy. Whereas in 2022 the central government still opted for a relatively open approach to cloud use, it is now drawing clearer lines. Some applications that are common today will soon no longer be permitted. And the obligations that apply to what is still allowed have been considerably tightened. In this blog, we outline the most important changes and explain why they are also relevant to organisations outside the central government.
The revision is the result of a combination of factors. In 2024, both the Central Government Audit Service (Auditdienst Rijk) and the Netherlands Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer) investigated the central government’s use of the cloud. Those evaluations provided valuable insights into how cloud policy works in practice and where it should be tightened. At the same time, the geopolitical context has changed significantly: the cloud market has become further concentrated in a small group of non-European players, and the risks of foreign interference have become more concrete and more urgent.
A specific political objective has also been set: the House of Representatives wants at least 30% of all cloud storage services and applications procured by the central government to come from Dutch-European soil by 2029.
The most striking new rule is the ban on public cloud for email and documents. Email services and document storage may not be processed in the public cloud unless three strict conditions are met cumulatively: it must have been independently established that the continuity of services would otherwise be at risk, a reviewed risk analysis and an exit plan must have been drawn up, and the decision must have been approved by the minister concerned in agreement with the minister or state secretary responsible for digitalisation. Workplace services are regarded as a national interest.
In addition, public cloud is prohibited for the source data of base registers, such as the Personal Records Database (Basisregistratie Personen). Public cloud is also explicitly not permitted for information classified as a state secret or for information falling under the classification levels Te Beschermen Belangen (Interests to be Protected) 1, 2 and 3.
Alongside the prohibitions, there is a strong recommendation against cloud use for a broad category of organisations. Organisations designated as vital providers, falling under the Critical Entities Resilience Act (Wet Weerbaarheid Kritieke Entiteiten) or qualifying as an Essential Entity under the Cybersecurity Act (Cyberbeveiligingswet) are advised against using cloud providers that fall wholly or partly under a jurisdiction outside the EU or EEA for their primary processes. This is not a strict ban, but in practice it is a firm policy line that supervisory authorities will also take into account.
Cloud use that is still permitted is subject to stricter obligations. The most important of these is a mandatory risk analysis for all “material cloud use”, meaning cloud use for primary tasks, core processes or large-scale processing of personal data, including a mandatory DPIA where personal data is involved and a DTIA for transfers to countries outside the EEA without an adequacy decision.
Furthermore, a documented exit plan must be in place for all material cloud use, covering two scenarios: a planned, controlled migration and an abrupt, unexpected interruption. Existing material cloud use for which no such plan exists yet will be given twelve months to arrange one.
New cloud use must be reported in advance to the Central Government CISO (CISO Rijk), and each ministry must report annually on all its material public cloud use to the Central Government CIO (CIO Rijk). A general “cloud, unless” policy, in which the default is that everything goes into the cloud unless there is a reason not to, is explicitly discouraged.
Data may only be stored and processed within the EEA and Switzerland. Data must be encrypted at rest and in transit, and key management should preferably not lie with the cloud provider. Special categories of personal data should preferably not be processed in the public cloud; if this is unavoidable, Privacy Enhancing Technologies are mandatory.
The transition period for existing cloud use is four years or the remaining term of existing contracts.
Formally, the government-wide cloud policy applies to the central government. However, its consequences reach further.
For suppliers to the government, the rules of the game are changing: tenders will include sovereignty requirements and SEAL levels, exit plans will become a contractual condition, and suppliers that do not meet the jurisdiction requirements will lose access to a significant part of the government market.
Organisations that qualify as an Essential Entity under the Cybersecurity Act are explicitly advised against placing their primary processes with non-EU providers. Supervisory authorities enforcing compliance with that Act will use this policy as a frame of reference.
And for any organisation considering its cloud strategy, the message of this policy is actually simple: know what you have, know what can happen to your data, make sure you have a way out, and put that in writing before you need it.
Would you like to know how you can anticipate the revised government-wide cloud policy in concrete terms? Please contact Natascha van Duuren, partner and attorney at law in IT, Privacy & Cybersecurity.
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